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HOW NOT TO APPLY ACTAVIS
Michael A. Carrier*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most pressing issues in patent and antitrust law today
involves agreements by which brand-name drug companies pay generic
firms to delay entering the market. In June 2013, in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that these “exclusion payment”1 settlements
(in which exclusion comes from the payment rather than the patent) could
have “significant anticompetitive effects” and violate the antitrust laws.2
In ensuring a robust role for antitrust analysis, the Court handed down
one of the most important business cases in the past generation. And it
articulated a blueprint for future analysis based on antitrust law’s “rule of
reason.” But the Court did not specify every step in the analysis or consider
every type of settlement. Instead, it called on “lower courts . . . [to]
structur[e] . . . the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”3
Along these lines, two recent district court rulings portend ominous
signs. In the first case, In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation,
the District of New Jersey granted a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ challenge
to a settlement on a drug treating epilepsy and bipolar disorder.4 In doing
so, the Lamictal court used the five factors that the Actavis Court had
employed to justify more aggressive antitrust scrutiny to instead excuse its
decision to employ less vigorous scrutiny. Just as concerning, it substituted
its own armchair analysis for the burdens of proof articulated in Actavis.
In the second case, In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litigation, the Rhode
Island District Court relied on Lamictal’s flawed framework to grant
motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ challenge to a settlement delaying generic
entry of an oral contraceptive.5 The court agonized over the “close call”
presented by the case while failing to recognize that it was its own
following of the Lamictal court’s framework that led it into briar patches of
*
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1
Payments from brands to generics are often called “reverse payments” because the payment flows
from patentee to alleged infringer (unlike typical settlements in which alleged infringers pay to enter the
market). This Essay uses the phrase “exclusion payments,” which better captures the exclusion that
brands can obtain by paying generics to delay entering the market.
2
133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237–38 (2013) [http://perma.cc/W67P-MU74].
3
Id. at 2238.
4
No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) [http://perma.cc/A5GN-Q6TE].
5
MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) [http://perma.cc/GT72TGLW].
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confusion, uncomfortable policy conclusions, neglect of pleading standards,
and encouragement of conduct that it knew would “evade [antitrust]
scrutiny.”6
If the Lamictal and Loestrin decisions are upheld and adopted by other
courts, plaintiffs will face insurmountable hurdles, rendering the landmark
Actavis decision nothing more than a dead letter. This Essay shows that the
Lamictal and Loestrin courts erred in (1) applying a framework never
anticipated in Actavis; (2) ignoring crucial holdings from Actavis; and (3)
amassing unjustified powers for themselves.
By blocking affordable generic prescription drugs, exclusion-payment
settlements cost consumers billions of dollars and have profound
consequences for public health. But if the trend unleashed by the Lamictal
and Loestrin cases is not quickly reversed, courts will be relegated to the
role of traffic cops waving anticompetitive settlements through flashing
green lights of judicial “scrutiny.”
II. ACTAVIS
In Actavis, the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling on the
application of antitrust law to exclusion-payment settlements. Most
important, it held that the existence of a patent did not immunize such
settlements from antitrust scrutiny. The Court found that “it would be
incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring [a] settlement’s
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by
measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.”7
Actavis was a significant ruling. In most of the decade before the
Court’s decision, nearly all the appellate courts that had examined
exclusion-payment settlements concluded that they did not present antitrust
concern because they fell within the scope of the patent.8 As applied by
these courts, judges relied on the mere existence of a patent—even one that
was invalid or not infringed—to justify any payment.9 In contrast, in
recognizing the anticompetitive effects of a payment for a potential rival to
delay entering the market, the Supreme Court offered a more nuanced and
appropriate analysis.
6

Id. at *12–13.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
8
See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“The essence of the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary
zone of the patent.”) [http://perma.cc/P7NU-WEK9]; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d
187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the settlement did not “unlawfully extend the reach” of the patent)
[http://perma.cc/A6X7-NG3J]; Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005)
(finding that the exclusion payments were “within the patent’s exclusionary power”)
[http://perma.cc/33PW-R8NW].
9
The courts only carved out exceptions for fraud before the Patent Office or sham litigation. See,
e.g., Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337; FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir.
2012) [http://perma.cc/4NT-FZB7].
7
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The Court in Actavis found that a brand’s payment “amounts to a
purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product, a right it
already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to continue and
the patent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic product.”10 The
Court worried that “a party with no claim for damages . . . walks away with
money simply so it will stay away from the patentee’s market.”11 And it
lamented that “payment in return for staying out of the market . . . simply
keeps prices at patentee-set levels,” which leads to gains for the patentee
and challenger but losses for the consumer.12
In addition to subjecting exclusion-payment settlements to antitrust
scrutiny, the Court made clear that future courts should analyze such
agreements under the rule of reason, which considers an agreement’s
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. Such a framework “consider[s]
traditional antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming
virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations.”13 As
part of the proposed analysis, the Court allowed plaintiffs to use shortcuts to
demonstrate anticompetitive effects and market power.14 And it anticipated
that defendants would bear the burden of demonstrating a payment’s
justifications.15
III. FIVE FACTORS: FRAMEWORK
The Lamictal and Loestrin courts purported to apply an analysis based
on the rule of reason. But they diverged from the Supreme Court in
centering their analysis on five factors discussed in Actavis. The Lamictal
court stated that “[t]he Actavis opinion lays out ‘five considerations’ to
guide district courts in applying the rule of reason.”16 And the Loestrin court
agreed that “[o]stensibly to assist the lower courts, Actavis set forth five
‘considerations’ to guide the inquiry as to whether a settlement payment
satisfies the rule of reason.”17
10

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
Id. at 2233.
12
Id. at 2234–35.
13
Id. at 2231. Courts engage in a more comprehensive analysis under the rule of reason than they
conduct under the per se review applicable to price-fixing, output-limitation, and market-allocation
agreements. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) [http://perma.cc/SR2M-K3X9].
14
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234, 2236 (explaining that exclusion payments have the “potential for
genuine adverse effects on competition” and that the “size of the payment” can serve as “a strong
indicator of [market] power”).
15
Id. at 2236–37 (“An antitrust defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate
justifications are present,” such as saved litigation costs or “fair value for services . . . . [O]ne who
makes such a payment may be unable to explain and to justify it.”).
16
In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at *5
(D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (quoting and citing Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–37).
17
In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *8
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014). Other courts have similarly erred in making this assertion though they have not
11
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Actavis did not, however, introduce the five factors as the foundation
of a new and unique rule-of-reason analysis. The Court’s intended analysis
followed the familiar antitrust framework that “consider[s] traditional
antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues,
market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations.”18
Instead, the Court employed the five factors for a very different reason:
to show why the “general legal policy favoring the settlement of disputes”
did not displace ordinary antitrust analysis.19 This was important. For the
decade before the Actavis decision, most appellate courts that had
considered exclusion-payment agreements had immunized them largely
based on the policy in favor of settlements, which conserve resources and
provide certainty. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC found that “[t]he general policy of the law is to favor the
settlement of litigation, and the policy extends to the settlement of patent
infringement suits.”20 Similarly, the Federal Circuit in In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation highlighted the “long-standing policy in
the law in favor of settlements, [which] extends to patent infringement
litigation.”21
Courts also deferred to settlements so as not to harm incentives for
innovation. The Tamoxifen court stated that rules “severely restricting”
settlements could hamper the patent system’s goals by increasing
uncertainty and delaying innovation.22 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. concluded that reduced
settlement options would raise enforcement costs and “impair . . . incentives
for disclosure and innovation.”23 And the Schering-Plough court found that
“the caustic environment of patent litigation” could reduce innovation by
increasing the “uncertainty around the drug manufacturer’s ability to
research, develop, and market the patented product.”24
The influence of the pro-settlement policy explains why the Supreme
Court tackled this argument head-on. To support its conclusion that the
policy did not immunize exclusion-payment settlements, the Court
employed five wide-ranging arguments that centered on exclusion
ordered their analysis around the five factors. See, e.g., In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., Civil Action
No. 11-5479 (PGS) (LHG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *59 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (“[T]he
Supreme Court specifically raised the following five sets of considerations to guide its rule of reason
analysis . . . .”) [http://perma.cc/RV23-EFXE]; In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., Civil Action No. 3:12-cv02389 (PGS), slip op. at 23 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014) (same) [http://perma.cc/A27G-588U].
18
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. For a discussion of plaintiffs’ ability to use exclusion payments as
shortcuts in proving anticompetitive effects and market power, see supra note 14.
19
Id. at 2234.
20
402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005).
21
544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
22
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006).
23
344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) [http://perma.cc/4L4U-5KN3].
24
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075.
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payments’ (1) anticompetitive effects, (2) lack of justification, and (3)
market power, along with (4) the feasibility of judicial analysis and (5)
parties’ ability to settle without payment.25
In case there were any doubt as to the Court’s use of the factors, it
made clear that “these [five] considerations, taken together, outweigh the
single strong consideration—the desirability of settlements—that led the
Eleventh Circuit to provide near-automatic antitrust immunity to reverse
payment settlements.”26 Applied to the case, the Court explained that “the
FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove its antitrust claim.”27
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s unmistakable use of the factors to
open a courthouse door that had been slammed shut by excessive deference
to the policy supporting settlements, the Lamictal and Loestrin courts used
the factors to conclude that the plaintiffs should not be given an opportunity
to prove their antitrust claim. In addition to using the five factors for very
different reasons than in Actavis, the courts adopted policy conclusions the
Supreme Court had specifically rejected. Finally, the Lamictal court found
room in the factors to engage in armchair speculation, while the Loestrin
court imposed astronomically high standards that future plaintiffs will
almost never be able to satisfy. These problems become painfully apparent
through analysis of each of the factors.
IV. FIVE FACTORS: APPLICATION
The framework that the Lamictal and Loestrin courts used to analyze
exclusion-payment settlements was wrong not only in the theory of the
Supreme Court’s anticipated antitrust analysis, but also in the application of
each of the five factors. Each of the factors was marred by analysis based
on speculation and the imposition of requirements nowhere found in—and
sometimes directly contrary to—Actavis.
A. Factor One: Adverse Effects on Competition
For the first factor, the Lamictal court assumed that “the settlement
does not have the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”28
The settlement involved a brand’s promise not to introduce its own generic,
known as an “authorized generic,” during the 180-day period reserved for
the first generic to file a “Paragraph IV” certification challenging a brand’s
patent, claiming that it is invalid or not infringed.29 Authorized generics are
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as brand drugs
25

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234–37 (2013).
Id. at 2237.
27
Id. at 2234.
28
In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014).
29
Id. at *2; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2013) [http://perma.cc/UTW5-DWGB].
26
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but marketed as generics.30 Even though the 180-day period is designed to
encourage generic entry and is uniquely valuable (potentially worth
hundreds of millions of dollars)31 to the first-filing generic, the brand is free
to introduce its own generic version during the period.32
A Federal Trade Commission study on authorized generics found that
the first-filing generic’s revenues are approximately twice as high when it
enjoys the 180-day period without an authorized generic.33 In addition, the
first filer loses 25% of its market share when it competes with an authorized
generic during the 180-day period.34 Given the value provided by a brand’s
promise not to introduce an authorized generic, the Lamictal court was too
hasty to assume the absence of the “potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition.”35
Nor are the reasons the court offered for its conclusion persuasive. The
court found solace in the fact that the generic “was allowed six months of
early entry,” that there were no monetary payments, and that the duration of
the agreement was a “relatively brief six months.”36 But “six months of
early entry” assumes that the brand was entitled to block entry until the end
of the patent term—an assumption that Actavis expressly rejected.37 In
addition, the court ignored fundamental economics in viewing money as
completely different from a promise worth an equivalent amount of
money.38 Finally, the suggestion that the no-authorized-generic pledge
covered a relatively brief six months ignores the well-known economics of
the pharmaceutical industry (in which drug prices decrease as the number of
generics on the market increases),39 not to mention Actavis’s express
acknowledgement that “the vast majority of potential profits for a generic
drug manufacturer materialize during the 180–day exclusivity period.”40
30

FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS, at i (2011) [http://perma.cc/LQ6V-65GP].
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235.
32
See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 275–76 (4th Cir. 2006) [http://perma.cc/E3QQCA3F]; Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [http://perma.cc/N26G4JS2].
33
FTC, supra note 30, at 58–59. Even after the exclusivity period, the effects continue, with
revenues of the first-filing generic 53% to 62% lower in the 30 months following exclusivity. Id. at iii.
34
Id. at 57.
35
In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014).
36
Id.
37
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. Such an argument is a variation on the “scope of the patent” test that
the Federal, Second, and Eleventh Circuits had followed in the decade before the Supreme Court
decisively rejected it in Actavis. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
38
See Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 35–47 (2014)
[http://perma.cc/8ED2-BAVL].
39
Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm12938
5.htm [http://perma.cc/GTL7-L5DV].
40
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
31
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While the Lamictal court incorrectly assumed a lack of competitive
harm, the Loestrin court erred by imposing hurdles never envisioned by
Actavis. This court claimed that Actavis suggested that application of the
first factor on adverse competitive effects “requires a comparison of the
anticipated supracompetitive profits associated with continued monopoly
sale of the product, and the sum paid to the generic competitor.”41 The
Loestrin court even claimed that “it would be all but impossible to assess
the ‘potential for genuine adverse effects on competition’ without the
ability to compare the expected monopoly profits to the size of the
patentee’s payment.”42
But Actavis never required such a comparison. Instead, the Court
highlighted the harms from payment and confirmed that the presence of
multiple generics would not prevent brands from entering into settlements.
It explained that a brand’s payment is essentially “a purchase . . . of the
exclusive right to sell its product” (which it would lose if it lost the patent
litigation) and that “payment in return for staying out of the market []
simply keeps prices at patentee-set levels.”43 Additionally, the Court
confirmed that brands would be able to enter into settlements (and that there
were not too may challengers to “buy off”) because of the unique position
possessed by first-filing generics.44
To support its requirement for comparing monopoly profits and
payment size, the Loestrin court quoted a passage from Actavis that a
payment may “‘provide strong evidence that the patentee seeks to induce
the generic . . . to abandon its claim with a share of its monopoly profits.’”45
But this passage only references a brand’s ability to use its monopoly
profits to induce a generic to drop its claim. It does not even hint at precise
calculations of monopoly profits and generic payment, let alone a
comparison between the two. As discussed below, such a high bar
effectively blocks plaintiffs from court.46
41
In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *8
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014).
42
Id. at *9 (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234).
43
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234. The Court explained that high prices could produce “the full patentrelated . . . monopoly return while dividing that return between the challenged patentee and the patent
challenger.” Id. at 2234–35. But it used the phrase “monopoly return” not to require plaintiffs to show an
exact amount but to make clear that the patentee and challenger divide the return, which leads to “[t]he
patentee and the challenger gain[ing and] the consumer los[ing].” Id. at 2235.
44
Id. at 2235.
45
Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *8 (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235).
46
Two recent opinions (authored by the same judge) set a similarly elevated bar in requiring nonmonetary payments to be “converted to a reliable estimate of its monetary value so that it may be
analyzed against the Actavis factors such as whether it is ‘large’ once the subtraction of legal fees and
other services provided by generics occurs.” In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., Civil Action No. 3:12-cv02389 (PGS), slip op. at 32 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014); see also In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *63 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014). The Lipitor court even required the plaintiffs to
prove the patentee’s lost profits through showings of “(1) demand for the product; (2) absence of
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B. Factor Two: Unjustified Payments
Turning to the second factor, the Lamictal court erred by mystically
finding that the payment at issue was justified.47 It reached this conclusion
by speculating that the brand “may . . . have derived some ancillary benefit
from [the generic’s] licensed sales . . . in terms of distribution and
marketing.”48 But such speculation is not appropriate: it is the defendant’s
burden to prove procompetitive justifications, not the court’s function to
assume them.
Compounding its error, the Lamictal court found that “the
consideration which the parties exchanged in the settlement is reasonably
related to the removal of the uncertainty created by the dispute.”49 But
Actavis was unambiguous in instructing that eliminating the risk that the
patent would be found invalid or not infringed—the risk that competition
would break out—is anticompetitive, not procompetitive. The payment
“likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition,” which “constitutes the
relevant anticompetitive harm.”50 Finally, the court’s admission that the
consideration “likely exceeds what the parties would have spent litigating
the patent dispute”51 shows that the settling patent litigants would not have
been able to rely on Actavis’s justification for payments not exceeding
litigation costs.
The Loestrin court committed a different error in its analysis of the
second factor of unjustified anticompetitive effects. In particular, it raised
the bar beyond Actavis by requiring the plaintiffs’ complaint to plead the
“monetary value of the settlement payment.”52 Requiring plaintiffs to prove
that the defendants’ business deal exceeded “fair value” contravenes
Actavis’s holding that defendants have the burden of proof on this
procompetitive justification.53 And requiring plaintiffs to negate this
justification in their complaint, when defendants possess the evidence
relating to the justifications for and valuations of the payment does not
make sense.54

noninfringing substitutes; (3) manufacturing and marketing capability; and (4) the amount of profit.”
Lipitor, slip op. at 35. This sets the bar too high: not only would plaintiffs not be able to make these
showings (let alone on a motion to dismiss) but also the Actavis Court made clear that it is defendants
that bear the burden of justifying payments for services. See infra Part IV.D.
47
In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
51
Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10.
52
In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014).
53
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236; see also supra note 15.
54
See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
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C. Factor Three: Market Power
For the third factor, the Lamictal court could not “conclude whether
the brand . . . has the market power needed to bring about anticompetitive
harm,” but it found that “this would not be dispositive.”55 Rather than
requiring courts to engage in detailed analyses of market power, however,
Actavis explained that a firm without market power is unlikely to pay large
sums to keep others out of its market.56 The Lamictal court failed to
recognize that a brand’s promise not to launch an authorized generic can
easily reflect “higher-than-competitive profits—a strong indication of
market power.”57
The Loestrin court fumbled the ball here, too. In Actavis, the Court
used the third factor to show that the pro-settlement policy did not
immunize settlements because plaintiffs could rely on certain payments
themselves to show market power. To the contrary, the Loestrin court stated
that courts “must consider whether the size of the reverse payment indicates
that the patentee held sufficient market power to ‘work unjustified
anticompetitive harm.’”58 And the court worked backwards from that false
premise to the conclusion that only cash payments are subject to antitrust
scrutiny because it is too difficult for courts to calculate the size of non-cash
payments.
But the Supreme Court never stated or implied that the only way for a
plaintiff to plead or prove market power was through the size of the
payment. And in addition to the payment, the Loestrin plaintiffs pled that
“[a]t all relevant times, [the brand’s] price for Loestrin 24 has been at least
60% above its marginal cost of production, and at least 40% above its
marginal cost including marketing costs.”59 The plaintiffs also alleged that
the brand “has never lowered the price of Loestrin 24 in response to the
pricing of other branded oral contraceptives (or the generic versions of
those other branded oral contraceptives).”60
D. Factor Four: Feasibility
Fourth, Actavis held that “the size of the unexplained reverse payment
can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness,” obviating the
need for courts to try a patent case within an antitrust case.61 The Lamictal
court, however, turned this around, concluding that “the sweep of the
55

Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
57
Id.
58
In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *8
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236).
59
Consolidated Class Action Complaint at ¶ 144, In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No.
13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) [http://perma.cc/D9L2-C2HS].
60
Id.
61
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37.
56
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settlement [did] not suggest that it [was] intended to maintain
supracompetitive prices and serve as a ‘workable surrogate for a patent’s
weakness.’”62
This was completely backward. Actavis did not add an intent
requirement into rule-of-reason analysis. The Supreme Court was referring
to courts using the payment as a “surrogate” for patent weakness (analyzing
the payment rather than re-litigating the patent merits), not to parties having
an intent to use the payment to mask patent weakness. In addition, it would
seem presumptuous to assume that the parties did not intend an
anticompetitive effect when they paid and received the payment
immediately after a court had ruled that a claim of the patent covering the
drug’s active ingredient was invalid.63
The Loestrin court similarly failed to recognize that Actavis employed
the fourth factor to show the feasibility of antitrust actions on the grounds
that “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the
antitrust question,” and in fact, “[a]n unexplained large reverse payment
itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the
patent’s survival.”64 But again, the Loestrin court put the burden on the
plaintiff to divine a precise value of the payment as a surrogate for a
patent’s weakness.65 In other words, if the plaintiff could not provide an
exact value, it would not be able to use the payment to demonstrate that the
patent likely was invalid or not infringed. Both courts thus took a factor
from Actavis that allowed plaintiffs to show patent weakness and twisted it
into an intent defense that courts could invoke to justify settlement.
E. Factor Five: Other Settlements
Fifth, the Lamictal court stated that “the parties settled in a way that
did not involve monetary reverse payments.”66 Referring again to “early”
entry and a “limited” six-month period of no authorized-generic entry, the
court ensured that the settling parties had the “latitude to settle without
triggering the antitrust scrutiny that large, unjustified reverse payments
bring.”67 But again, Actavis taught the exact opposite lesson in its reminder
that litigating parties had ways to settle that did not involve payment.68 Far
62
In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37).
63
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 18, In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust
Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (noting that the generic “had
already succeeded in invalidating Claim 1 of the ‘017 patent covering the active ingredient of Lamictal”
and alleging that “the remaining claims of the patent at issue were extremely weak and highly likely to
be held invalid”) [http://perma.cc/56PS-Q5X7].
64
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
65
Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9.
66
Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10.
67
Id.
68
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (noting that litigating parties may “settle in other ways, for example,
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from revealing an intent to give patent litigants the leeway to settle with
payment, the Supreme Court made clear that the antitrust laws are likely to
forbid arrangements by which the settling parties “maintain and . . . share
patent-generated monopoly profits.”69
The Loestrin court ventured even further afield in asserting that courts
should “assess the payment in light of the reasons given for its having been
made.”70 In Actavis, the Court highlighted the need for antitrust liability
when the parties seek to maintain and share patent-generated monopoly
profits. But the Court did not anticipate an open-ended assessment of the
reasons for the payment. Nor did it expect plaintiffs to be required to
demonstrate a precise settlement value and compare it to monopoly profits
to discern the “basic reason” for the settlement.71
*

*

*

In short, the Lamictal and Loestrin courts applied an antitrust analysis
that used the five factors in a manner directly contrary to the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Actavis. The Court applied the factors to show that the
pro-settlement policy should not immunize exclusion-payment settlements
and allow the FTC to prove its case. In contrast, the Lamictal and Loestrin
courts used the factors to block plaintiffs from proving their cases. The
Lamictal court assumed that there were no anticompetitive effects, that
payments were justified, and that there was no intent to maintain monopoly
prices.72 The Loestrin court supplemented this speculation by imposing the
hurdle of calculating a “true value” and by punishing plaintiffs that were not
able to make such a determination, finding that they would not be able to
show anticompetitive effects, unjustified payments, market power, patent
weakness, or the “basic reason” for settlement.73
V. UNHEEDED HOLDINGS
The Lamictal and Loestrin courts also erred in disregarding four
essential holdings from Actavis, which addressed (1) the public policy in
favor of settlement; (2) parties’ inability to settle cases without exclusion
payments; (3) the elimination of risk as a justification; and (4) the burdens
imposed on plaintiffs.
by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee's market prior to the patent's expiration,
without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point”).
69
Id.
70
Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9.
71
See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
72
In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014).
73
Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9, *12 (asserting that “each of the five Actavis factors plainly
requires” the comparing of brand revenues to the payment).

123

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

A. Settlement Policy
The first unheeded holding involved an excessive deference to the
public policy reasons in support of settlement. As discussed above, this
policy played a role in appellate courts’ insufficient scrutiny of settlements
in the decade before Actavis.74 The Loestrin court asserted that “the fact that
the majority and the dissent recognize and promote the public policy value
of patent settlements[] suggests that Actavis should be read to apply solely
to the cash settlements that it describes, and to exclude non-cash
settlements, preserving for litigants a viable path to resolve their disputes.”75
In contrast to the Loestrin court’s assertion, the Actavis Court
exhaustively detailed why the policy in favor of settlement was not
commanding enough to outweigh the other policy considerations favoring
antitrust scrutiny of exclusion-payment settlements. The Loestrin court’s
disregard of this holding was particularly ironic given Actavis’s invocation
of five factors to rebut the policy and the Loestrin court’s own application
of the five factors (albeit for a contrary objective). Along similar lines, the
Loestrin court’s statement that the Actavis majority “recognize[d] and
promote[d] the public policy value of patent settlements” is brazen in its
disregard of the Supreme Court’s holding.76
B. Need for Exclusion Payments
Second, the Lamictal and Loestrin courts worried that applying
antitrust scrutiny to non-cash settlements would reduce patent litigants’
ability to settle. The Lamictal court stated that Actavis “made clear its intent
to give patent litigants latitude to settle without triggering the antitrust
scrutiny that large, unjustified reverse payments bring.”77 In addition, the
court found that denying a safe harbor for anything other than entry-date
settlements (without payment) would “far too greatly constrict parties’
power to settle, a power the Actavis court clearly meant to keep intact.”78
The Loestrin court went even further, avowing that “there can be no
dispute that the holding in Actavis and the abandonment of the scope-ofthe-patent test will make it more difficult for patent litigants to settle.”79 But
this court oddly relied on an article written by a lawyer who has represented
defendants in exclusion-payment settlement cases rather than the Supreme
Court, which directly addressed the issue.80 Nor was the Loestrin court
74

See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *11.
76
Id.
77
Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10.
78
Id. at *7 n.4.
79
Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *11.
80
See id. (citing Kevin D. McDonald, Because I Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v.
Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 36, 42 (noting representation of “defendants in all of the
Ciprofloxacin cases” and in the Nexium case) [http://perma.cc/B69D-DY3J]).
75
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correct that the Supreme Court rendered non-cash settlements immune from
antitrust scrutiny to “preserv[e] for litigants a viable path to resolve their
disputes.”81
In Actavis, the Justices made clear that the risk of antitrust liability
from payment “does not prevent litigating parties from settling their
lawsuit.”82 The Court pointed out that parties could pursue alternative forms
of settlement, such as “allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the
patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee
paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”83
These agreements, by which brands and generics divide the patent term
by selecting a time for generic entry, tend to reflect the odds of success in
patent litigation (and thus do not present similar antitrust concern).84 And
the settlements are more than possible—in fact, they are typical, as shown
by a recent FTC report that more than 70% of settlements do not involve
payment or delayed generic entry.85
C. Risk as Justification
The Lamictal court also erred in accepting the elimination of patent
risk as a justification the defendants could offer to excuse their settlement.
The court found that “the consideration which the parties exchanged in the
settlement is reasonably related to the removal of the uncertainty created by
the dispute.”86 But, as discussed above, Actavis clearly explained that
eliminating the risk that a patent would be found invalid or not infringed is
anticompetitive. The payment “likely seeks to prevent the risk of
competition,” which “constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.”87 The
Lamictal court should not be able to resurrect a justification that the
Supreme Court specifically considered and rejected.
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Id.
FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
83
Id.
84
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., 1 IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.3, at 15–45 (2d ed. Supp. 2012); Robert D. Willig &
John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward Agreements that Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST
BULL. 655, 660 (2004) [http://perma.cc/T23W-LLP8].
85
See FTC BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT
OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, at 1–2 (2013) [http://perma.cc/4SME-J665].
Evidence from Europe is consistent, with the most recent monitoring report concluding that 93% of
settlements between brands and generics “f[e]ll into categories that prima facie raise no need for
competition law scrutiny.” European Commission, 4th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements,
¶ 51 (Dec. 9, 2013) [http://perma.cc/5N77-CY4N].
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In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at
*10 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014).
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Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (emphasis omitted).
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D. Burdens on Plaintiffs
Both the Lamictal and Loestrin courts inappropriately shifted several
burdens to the plaintiffs. The Lamictal court provided an irrebuttable
presumption that the settlement at issue was procompetitive based on its
bare assertions that it did not “have the potential for genuine adverse effects
on competition,” that the payment was justified, and that “the sweep of the
settlement does not suggest that it is intended to maintain supracompetitive
prices and serve as a ‘workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness.’”88
The Loestrin court allowed plaintiffs to try to make these showings.
But it imposed the entire burden on plaintiffs, asserting that “[c]ritically,
each of the[] five factors requires, on the part of the plaintiff . . . an ability
to assess or calculate the true value of the payment.”89 Additionally, if the
plaintiff could not definitively prove the monetary value of the payment, it
would be unable to demonstrate that the payment was unjustified.90
The Actavis Court, however, never envisioned plaintiffs being forced
to prove each of the factors. The Court explained that “[a]n antitrust
defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate justifications
are present” and that in some cases the defendant might be “unable to
explain and to justify [its payment].”91 Putting the burden on defendants is
consistent with their ability to justify a payment by showing that it reflects
saved litigation costs or “fair value for services.”92
In addition to shifting inappropriate burdens to plaintiffs, the Loestrin
court raised the burdens to extremely high levels, requiring plaintiffs to
show a payment’s “true value” and asserting that the failure to make such a
precise calculation would prevent them from showing each of the factors it
expected plaintiffs to prove: anticompetitive effect, unjustified payment,
market power, patent weakness, and the reasons for settlement.93
The Loestrin court recognized that this imposed insurmountable
burdens on plaintiffs. The court admitted that the pleading standard
articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly94 requires only “plausible
grounds to infer an agreement” and “does not impose a probability
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Lamictal, 2014 WL 282755, at *10.
In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 13–2472–S–PAS, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014).
90
Id. (citing Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236).
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Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37.
92
Id. at 2236; see also Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 18 (noting
that “defendants are in possession of the relevant evidence about their side deals,” that “complexity is
the result of the defendants’ own actions,” and that “[t]he parties to a payment for delay have ample
reason to pack complexities into the deal (such as relatively unimportant services) to conceal its genuine
nature”) [http://perma.cc/59QW-6YKA].
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Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *9. The court even created the rule that “in reverse payment
contexts where rule of reason scrutiny is not applicable, dismissal is required.” Id. at *12.
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550 U.S. 544 (2007) [http://perma.cc/BPB9-9WRP].
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requirement.”95 In fact, the Loestrin court confessed that the plaintiffs had
submitted “two robust complaints” containing “facts demonstrating illegal
contracts or combinations in restraint of trade.”96
In contravention of its exhortations to show a payment’s “true value,”
however, the court conceded that the plaintiffs “(understandably)
struggle[d] to affix a precise dollar value” to the brand’s non-cash payment
for delay, and that “[t]his should come as no surprise because pleading facts
sufficient to glean the monetary value of non-cash settlements is a tall task,
one that would typically require considerable discovery to achieve.”97
Further arguing against itself, the court explained that this was
“particularly true” when a “settlement involves licenses and co-promotion
arrangements for other drugs and a ‘no authorized generic’ agreement,” as
these arrangements make “even a ballpark estimate . . . difficult to
conjure.”98 In short, the Loestrin court recognized that plaintiffs would not
be able to demonstrate a precise value for payment and that its ruling was
not consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Twombly. Despite these
legitimate concerns, the court nonetheless forged ahead by manufacturing
out of whole cloth precision requirements from Actavis. And it applied
these creations to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims even though it conceded that
“the [p]laintiffs have adequately pled the existence of a Sherman Act § 1
violation.”99
VI. JUDICIAL BLAME-SHIFTING
In addition to misapplying the rule-of-reason framework and
neglecting four crucial Actavis holdings, the Loestrin court placed the
blame for its opinion squarely on the Supreme Court. The court lamented
that if the Supreme Court had “intended for rule of reason scrutiny to apply
to non-cash settlements, it could simply have said so.”100 But this
unsuccessful attempt at judicial blame-shifting merely highlights problems
with the Loestrin court’s own reasoning.
The Loestrin court concluded that Actavis permits antitrust scrutiny of
only cash payments because calculating the value of an above-market-value
business deal is too difficult and therefore does not satisfy the five factors.
95

Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *11 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *12. Heightened burdens on plaintiffs also result from the three-part test that the Lamictal
court created (and Loestrin court followed), which asks (1) if there is a reverse payment and (2) if such a
payment is large and unjustified, followed by (3) the rule of reason. Id. at *7; In re Lamictal Direct
Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). Such
a framework imposes burdens on plaintiffs (who, for example, are required to show that the payment is
unjustified) and can put undue emphasis on cash payments.
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But Loestrin lost track of the obvious fact that Actavis itself involved not a
cash payment, but an above-market-value business deal. As the Supreme
Court explained: “[t]he companies described these payments as
compensation for other services the generics promised to perform, but the
FTC contends the other services had little value.”101 The Loestrin court thus
was not correct in asserting that Actavis’s analysis precludes scrutiny of a
payment in the very form that the Supreme Court held is subject to scrutiny
and as to which it reversed the complaint’s dismissal.102 To state it gently,
this is a good indicator that Loestrin’s reading of Actavis is wrong.
Pointing to an additional form of payment—the no-authorized-generic
clause—Loestrin lamented that Actavis did not address all of the non-cash
forms that an unlawful payment might take. But it is not realistic to expect
the Court to address every issue that could conceivably arise in any future
case, including the form that every such agreement could take. The Court
decided numerous contested issues for the first time in Actavis, including
(1) the role of antitrust law in reviewing exclusion-payment settlements, (2)
the effect of the “scope of the patent” test, (3) the effect of the policy
favoring settlements, (4) whether brands could pay off all the relevant
generics, (5) which justifications the Court would allow the settling parties
to offer, (6) the feasibility of antitrust analysis of exclusion-payment
settlements, (7) whether the payment provides any information about the
patent merits, (8) the ability of the parties to settle without exclusion
payments, and (9) the type of analysis that future courts should apply.103 Is it
any surprise that the Court (additionally justifying its ruling against three
dissenting Justices) did not address every possible permutation of
settlement and conveyance of non-cash consideration?
The Loestrin court soberly considered its role as a loyal foot soldier in
the process of developing the common law, which is marked by “stability”
and undergoes an “evolution [that] takes place gradually and incrementally
and usually in a direction that can be predicted.”104 But it recognized that the
Actavis decision would “only serve as the solution to anticompetitive pay
for delay arrangements insofar as it encompasses both cash and these
increasingly prevalent non-cash settlements.”105 In fact, the court recognized
that patent settlements were increasingly taking non-cash forms.106
101

FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
Compare id. (describing payments for “other services the generics promised to perform”) with
Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *4 (describing payments for generic’s co-promotion of unrelated drug).
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Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–38.
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Loestrin, 2014 WL 4368924, at *10.
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Id. at *12.
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Id. The Loestrin court’s error in failing to acknowledge that Actavis itself involved an abovemarket-value business deal infiltrated its analysis of the no-authorized-generic provision. The complaint
in Actavis alleged that through the side agreement, “in substance, the plaintiff agreed to pay the
defendants many millions of dollars to stay out of its market.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (emphasis
added). The Loestrin court failed to recognize its duty to determine whether the no-authorized-generic
102
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Ironically, the Loestrin court understood that “it is of relatively little
import whether a payment for delay is made in the form of cash or some
other form of consideration.”107 The reason is that “[w]hen a patent holder
pays a would-be generic competitor to stay out of the market—regardless of
the form of the payment—value is exchanged and the brand manufacturer is
able to continue on with fewer competitors.”108
In other words, the court recognized that its “cautious” approach would
lead to insufficient scrutiny.109 In fact, the court admitted that its ruling
would result in “pharmaceutical companies tak[ing] the obvious cue to
structure their settlements in ways that avoid cash payments,” which would
lead to the agreements “evad[ing] Sherman Act scrutiny.”110 It is hard to see
how a ruling that throws open the barnyard doors to any and all
anticompetitive settlements, even in a case that the court conceded met
Twombly’s pleading requirements, charts a defensible course to the analysis
of conduct that “tend[s] to have significant adverse effects on
competition.”111
CONCLUSION
In Actavis, the Supreme Court emphasized the dire harms that result
when brands pay generics to delay entering the market. And it made clear
that future courts would apply the rule of reason to this conduct, bestowing
on plaintiffs potential shortcuts to show anticompetitive harm and market
power, and imposing burdens on defendants to show justifications based on
litigation costs or unrelated services.
The Lamictal and Loestrin courts turned this framework on its head.
They took the five factors that Actavis employed to show why the prodefendant policy in favor of settlement was not dispositive and used it,
combined with armchair speculation and astronomical hurdles, to block
plaintiffs from the courthouse steps. They did this even at the motion-todismiss stage in contravention of Twombly and in recognition of the fact
that the requisite evidence was not available until after discovery.
The two courts got it exactly backwards. The Lamictal court assumed
the defendants’ case to be true. And the Loestrin court forced plaintiffs to
bear the burden of proving a precise payment instead of merely recognizing
the existence of a payment for delayed generic entry. If these decisions are
allowed to stand and are adopted by other courts, there will be no scrutiny
of these agreements. The patent litigants will gladly accept the roadmap the

pledge (and above-market-value side deals) in substance alleged the same.
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Loestrin court graciously provided, which will lead them to (as Loestrin
warned) “evade Sherman Act scrutiny.”112
Such treatments of Actavis are not consistent with the Court’s
framework and in fact gut the Court’s decision. Lower courts should not be
able to read Supreme Court opinions out of existence by adopting
frameworks antithetical to the opinion, ignoring the Court’s policy
conclusions, and amassing powers for themselves that the Court never
anticipated.
Not only would such a course have catastrophic consequences for our
judicial system, but it also would return us to the days between 2005 and
2012, when the courts, applying the scope-of-the-patent test, immunized
nearly all exclusion-payment settlements. For agreements that cost
consumers billions of dollars and have dramatic consequences for public
health, the results would be catastrophic.
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